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ABSTRACT 
 Those who defend systems against cyber-attacks can use moving target defense 
(MTD) to their advantage. However, optimal MTD techniques have yet to be sufficiently 
explored. In terms of cost-benefit analysis, the desired level of attack suppression will 
come at the cost of network availability, and optimization tools might be able to harness 
the advantages of MTD without undue sacrifice. This thesis formulates an attack/defense 
scenario as a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) to facilitate optimal 
MTD of a host. We develop a system in which service and IP reconfigurations can be 
employed as defense against a five-stage attack to maximize system availability and 
minimize cost. With an attack/defense scenario involving five attack stages and two 
defense options, we explore the utility of the Determinized Sparse Partially Observable 
Tree (DESPOT) algorithm for online optimal defense selection using the POMDP 
formulation. We compare optimization of the system for three different cases of the 
POMDP with varying levels of uncertainty (i.e., probability of detection) representing 
potential real-world scenarios. A significant result of this thesis is our development of a 
framework for optimizing MTD techniques. We also demonstrate, within the limitations 
of this research, how to determine the bounds for best performance when using DESPOT 
as an MTD controller. 
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Cyber-attacks continue to be a major threat as well as the fastest growing crime in 
society today [1]. The use of computer systems, electronic data, and electronic data transfer 
is vital to federal agencies in carrying out their work and missions [2]. The protection of 
these systems, data, and communication methods is therefore vital to the protection of 
sensitive information and the protection of the nation.   
Both traditional network systems and traditional network defenses have similar 
characteristics of being static in nature; thus, as an adversary gains information on a target 
over time, they are more likely to succeed in launching a successful attack [3]. Moving 
target defense was introduced in 2009 as a method to deviate from this static environment 
towards a more dynamic and unpredictable environment, meaning that time would no 
longer be an advantage to the adversary [3]. There has been a significant amount of research 
in moving target defense in the last decade; however, there has been less research dedicated 
to its optimization in terms of cost/reward for the defender [4].   
The motivation for this thesis lies in optimizing moving target defense. The 
research conducted in this thesis brings more clarity to harnessing the advantages of 
moving target defense to achieve desired attack suppression while minimizing undue 
sacrifice of various cost factors. This thesis directly contributes to improving network 
security. 
A. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this thesis is to optimize moving target defense techniques by 
formulating an attack and defense model as a partially observable Markov decision process 
(POMDP) to facilitate such techniques. The attack model is derived from the intrusion kill 
chain, and the defense model involves two different moving target defense techniques, 
namely IP reconfigurations and service reconfigurations. 
DESPOT (Determinized Sparse Partially Observable Tree) is an online planning 
tool used to solve the POMDP model in this thesis. The performance of DESPOT as an 
MTD controller in uncertain environments will also be reviewed in this thesis. The 
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performance is analyzed to determine how well decision making follows the optimal policy 
of the POMDP model. 
B. RELATED WORK 
The related work for this thesis can be divided into two categories: works that were 
critical in the development and solution of the POMDP model in this thesis and works that 
are related in topic. 
The moving target defense techniques employed in this thesis, as well as their 
respective costs, are directly related to the work performed by Connell et al. [4]. They 
propose a concurrent moving target defense technique with both service and IP 
reconfigurations. The transition matrix of the POMDP model developed in this thesis is 
derived from the data collected by Panjwani et al. [5]. They conducted a study to determine 
the likelihood that port scans and vulnerability scans are precursors to attacks. This data 
allowed us to determine the transition probabilities for the attack model in our POMDP. 
Using these two references to build a cohesive model of attack defense dynamics was 
introduced in [6], which we used as the basis for the model in this thesis with transition 
probabilities discerned from analysis of honeypot data from [5]. 
The concept of the intrusion kill chain was used to develop a model on which to 
implement moving target defenses in this thesis. The intrusion kill chain is described in 
depth in [7]. The categories of moving target defense as well as the different techniques 
used to implement it are critical to this thesis and are catalogued in [3] and [8]. The concepts 
of Markov decision processes as well as POMDPs were critical in the development of the 
POMDP model in this thesis. Markov decision processes are covered in [9], and POMDPs 
are covered in [10]. Understanding POMDPs and approaches to finding their solutions in 
partially stochastic environments is thoroughly explored in [11] and [12]. DESPOT, which 




There are five chapters as well as three appendices in this thesis. Chapter II covers 
background information on the intrusion kill chain, moving target defense, Markov 
decision process including POMDPs, as well as POMDP solution methods and DESPOT. 
The methodology employed in this thesis in order to optimize the employment of moving 
target defense techniques is explored in Chapter III. Chapter IV details the implementation 
of the ideas described in the methodology as well as the results. The conclusions as well as 
considerations for future work are discussed in Chapter V. Appendix A contains the 
POMDP model developed in this thesis. Appendix B contains all of the MATLAB code 
used in the analysis of the POMDP models as well as the results obtained from DESPOT.   
4 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The concepts essential to the proposed optimization scheme in this thesis are 
explored in this chapter. First, network intrusions and the intrusion kill chain are 
introduced. Next, traditional network intrusion defense methods are introduced with a 
focus on moving target detection. Then, possible modeling techniques, including POMDPs 
for optimizing moving target defense in an uncertain environment, are discussed. Finally, 
DESPOT is examined as a solution to POMDPs.   
A. INTRUSION KILL CHAIN 
Protected networks are always at risk to unauthorized intrusions, and as these 
intrusions continue to evolve in robustness and complexity, it is necessary to adapt network 
defense systems in a parallel fashion. One example of a threat that has gained notoriety in 
recent years for its ability to defeat traditional network defense systems is the advanced 
persistent threat (APT) [7]. APTs vary from traditional threats in that they are uniquely 
crafted to compromise a specific target and are designed to operate for a long period of 
time while evading detection [14]. In order to improve network defense system ability to 
protect against more complex and untraditional threats, such as APTs, Lockheed Martin 
developed the concept of the intrusion kill chain depicted in Figure 1 [7].   
 
Figure 1. Intrusion Kill Chain. Adapted from [7]. 
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 The Intrusion Kill Chain is a process that describes the stages of complex network 
intrusions, such as APTs, from the adversary perspective [7]. The information gained in 
each stage is often times necessary in order to advance to the next stage of the process, and 
a disruption at any point in this chain is likely to prevent the process from proceeding 
forward [7]. There are seven stages: the reconnaissance stage is where data is gathered on 
the target, the weaponization stage is where the weapon or exploit is designed for the target, 
the delivery phase is where that weapon is transmitted to the target, the exploitation stage 
is where the weapon is triggered by the adversary and takes advantage of the target 
vulnerabilities, the installation stage is where the weapon establishes a way to maintain 
long term functionality within the target environment, the command and control stage is 
where the adversary establishes two way communication with the weapon for better 
control, and the action stage is where the weapon carries out the actions for which it was 
designed [7].   
The Intrusion Kill Chain provides a model for the wide breadth of specialized 
complex intrusions used by APTs and categorizes the adversary goals, actions, and targeted 
vulnerabilities in such a way that creates a common framework across these intrusions [7]. 
This allows defenders to better identify their vulnerabilities and focus their defense 
capabilities against attacks that are specifically targeted for them [7]. With better focused 
defenses, defenders are able to adapt to an environment in which attacks are becoming 
more and more complex. 
B. MOVING TARGET DEFENSE 
Traditional network defenses are not always enough to successfully defend against 
increasingly complex network intrusions. Traditional network defenses focus on reducing 
system vulnerabilities and enhancing already existing protection measures, such as 
firewalls, but these defenses are still being overcome by sophisticated network intrusions 
[3]. Moving target defense was developed in 2009 as a new way of defending against 
network intrusions [3]. Traditional defense measures, even with constant improvements, 
do not change the static nature of network dynamics; however, the moving target defense 
changes the static nature to a dynamic one [3]. By changing the nature of network systems, 
7 
moving target defense increases the workload of the attacker and decreases the success rate 
of sophisticated network intrusions [3]. 
Moving target defense changes the network system from a static system to dynamic 
one by constantly altering the attack surface of the network which in turn makes it more 
difficult for an attacker to proceed along the intrusion kill chain [15]. Figure 2 shows that 
in a dynamic system, the attack surface is constantly moving around within the exploration 
space, which includes all the possible combinations of collected information from the 
attacker reconnaissance phase [3]. The attack surface of network system includes all the 
ways in which an attacker can access and connect to that system [15]. For example, when 
considering the intrusion kill chain stages, if the attacker has found a vulnerable service 
the target is using in the reconnaissance phase, and that service is randomly changed, the 
attacker will have to step back and regain that information before it can proceed to the next 
stage in the chain. When the attack surface is constantly changing, time is no longer an 
advantage to the attacker, which decreases the likelihood that complex, persistent threats, 
like the APT, will succeed.  
 
Figure 2. Static System to Dynamic System. Adapted from [3]. 
There are multiple different techniques that can be used to employ moving target 
defense, all of which change the attack surface of a system [15]. These MTD techniques 
fall into different categories that include dynamic data, software, runtime environment, 
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platforms, and networks; these are shown in Figure 3 [8]. Each of these techniques aims to 
protect different components of a system while also targeting the different phases of a 
cyber-attack [8]. This thesis focuses on techniques that fall into the category of dynamic 
platforms and networks. Dynamic platforms involve restricting system access of 
applications and restricting external connections to the system while dynamic networks 
involve obscuring network headers and obscuring the mapping of the network [8]. 
 
Figure 3. Moving Target Defense Techniques. Adapted from [8]. 
This thesis employs two types of moving target defense techniques, IP 
reconfigurations and service reconfigurations, in a concurrent manner in order to create a 
dynamic network and platform [4]. Internet Protocol (IP) reconfigurations are dynamic 
network techniques that randomize the IP address of the victim making it difficult for the 
attacker to locate the victim [4]. Service reconfigurations are dynamic platform techniques 
that randomize the services that the victim is using, such as a web service, making it 
difficult for the attacker to find a vulnerable service connected to the victim [4]. Different 
techniques are ideal against different types of attacks, and using multiple types of MTD 
techniques in one model increases the breadth of possible attacks that a system can defend 
against [4]. 
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Unfortunately, most moving target defense techniques, including the two employed 
in this thesis, come with a cost to the defender in terms of equipment required for the 
techniques and temporary loss of network availability [4]. This thesis focuses on 
optimizing the employment of moving target defense techniques in terms of cost/reward to 
maximize the defender network availability while maintaining the desired level of defense 
against attacks.  
C. MARKOV DECISION PROCESS 
This thesis relies heavily on the concept of the Markov decision processes (MDP), 
which is a well-known model used to study optimization. A Markov decision process 
(MDP) is a mathematical model for a probabilistic system that allows one to plan for an 
optimal outcome when that outcome is only partially under the control of the decision 
maker [9]. This model can either represent a finite or infinite system in which a series of 
actions transition the system among a series of states, all with the goal of balancing 
immediate rewards/costs with future rewards/cost [9].   
The components of an MDP include a set of decision epochs (𝑇𝑇), a set of states  
(𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆), a set of actions (𝑎𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝐴), transition probabilities (𝑇𝑇(𝑠𝑠,𝑎𝑎, 𝑠𝑠′) = 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡(𝑠𝑠′|𝑠𝑠,𝑎𝑎)), and 
rewards (𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠,𝑎𝑎, 𝑠𝑠′) = 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡(𝑠𝑠,𝑎𝑎)) where (𝑠𝑠,𝑎𝑎, 𝑠𝑠′) defines a transition [11]. The collection of 
these components as a whole, {𝑆𝑆,𝐴𝐴,𝑇𝑇,𝑅𝑅}, is referred to as an MDP [11]. The following is 
a description of these components: decision epochs are points in time where decisions are 
made; system states are characterizations of the system at different points in time where 
the decision epochs occur; actions are the result of decision epochs that transition the 
system between states; transition probabilities are action dependent and represent the 
likelihood of transitioning to another state after an action has been taken; and rewards are 
the results of actions in the form of cost/reward to the system [9].   
A Markov chain is a symbolic representation of an MDP, an example of which is 
depicted in Figure 4 with states and transition probabilities labeled [9]. There are two states 
represented by 𝑆𝑆0 and 𝑆𝑆2, and there are four transition probabilities represented by 𝑝𝑝00, 
𝑝𝑝01, 𝑝𝑝11, and 𝑝𝑝10.  If an action is taken in 𝑆𝑆0, the model will either stay in 𝑆𝑆0 or transition 
to 𝑆𝑆1 according to the transition probabilities, 𝑝𝑝00 and 𝑝𝑝01.  
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Figure 4. Markov Chain. Adapted from [9]. 
The transition probabilities of Markov chains can be represented as matrices, and 
the transition matrix for the Markov chain depicted in Figure 4 can be written as [9]: 
𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 = �
𝑝𝑝00 𝑝𝑝01
𝑝𝑝10 𝑝𝑝11�  .                                                            (1) 
Limiting state probabilities can be used to define the steady state of a transition matrix, and 
are often useful in analyzing MDPs [16]. The equation for limiting state probabilities can 





(𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘)𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝[0],                                             (2) 
where 𝑝𝑝 is the vector of steady-state probabilities and 𝑝𝑝[0] is the initial state probability 
vector [16]. As 𝑘𝑘 → ∞,  a transition matrix will reach a steady state where the rows become 
equal and the elements remain unchanged from that point forward [16].     
 In MDPs, agents make decisions based on policies (𝜋𝜋: 𝑆𝑆 → 𝐴𝐴) which map states to 
actions [17]. The value of a policy is the long-term evaluation of a policy expressed as a 
numerical quantity. The value of a policy is defined by 
𝑉𝑉𝜋𝜋(𝑠𝑠) = 𝑅𝑅�𝑠𝑠,𝜋𝜋(𝑠𝑠)� + �  
𝑠𝑠′∈𝑆𝑆
𝑇𝑇(𝑠𝑠,𝜋𝜋(𝑠𝑠), 𝑠𝑠′) · 𝛾𝛾 · 𝑉𝑉𝜋𝜋(𝑠𝑠′),                        (3) 
which considers both immediate rewards and discounted rewards [17]. Discounted rewards 
are future rewards included in a policy that are discounted by the discount factor (𝛾𝛾) so that 
they impact decision making less than immediate rewards [17]. Optimal policies (π∗) are 
policies that have the highest values and maximize the expected utility if followed moving 
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forward [17]. The goal of an MDP is to maximize long term total discounted reward, which 
is accomplished by maximizing the value function  
𝑉𝑉∗(𝑠𝑠) = 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚
𝑎𝑎∈𝐴𝐴
�𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠,𝑎𝑎) + �  
𝑠𝑠′∈𝑆𝑆
 𝑇𝑇(𝑠𝑠,𝑎𝑎, 𝑠𝑠′) · 𝛾𝛾 · 𝑉𝑉∗(𝑠𝑠′)� ,                            (4) 
known as the Bellman equation, which leads to the optimal policy [17]. There is only one 
𝑉𝑉∗ that solves the bellman equation; however, there may be multiple optimal policies that 
lead to the same 𝑉𝑉∗ [17].   
MDPs are Markovian and fully observable, meaning that decisions are made based 
only on the current state of the system and that those decisions are made with full certainty 
of the current state of the system [9]. During a cyber-attack, it is not always apparent to the 
system that it is being attacked or what stage of the attack is being carried out, thus it is not 
always apparent to a system what state of attack it is under. MDPs are not suitable to this 
type of scenario; however, they set the foundation for a model that is suitable, the POMDP.   
D. PARTIALLY OBSERVABLE MARKOV DECISION PROCESS 
A partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) is a variation of the 
MDP that provides a framework for planning under uncertainty in stochastic environments. 
Instead of the agent knowing the true state of the system, the agent receives observations, 
which may or may not be synonymous with the true state of the system, and reasons in a 
state of beliefs when making decisions [18]. To account for uncertainty and the possible 
disparity between observation and state, observations (𝑍𝑍) as well as observation 
probabilities (𝑂𝑂) are added to the POMDP [18]. The collection of components of a POMDP 
vary slightly from an MDP and are represented as {𝑆𝑆,𝐴𝐴,𝑍𝑍,𝑇𝑇,𝑂𝑂,𝑅𝑅} [18]. 
The components 𝑆𝑆, 𝐴𝐴, 𝑇𝑇 and 𝑅𝑅 are identical to those in an MDP, while the 
components, 𝑍𝑍 and 𝑂𝑂, are specific to POMDPs [18]. When an action is taken, the system 
transitions from one state to another according to its transition probabilities and receives 
an observation (𝑧𝑧 ∈ 𝑍𝑍) with probability 𝑂𝑂(𝑠𝑠′,𝑎𝑎, 𝑧𝑧) = 𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧|𝑠𝑠′,𝑎𝑎) and a reward 𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠,𝑎𝑎). 
Because the state cannot be directly observed in a POMDP, a belief space (𝐵𝐵) is maintained 
and represented as a probability distribution over 𝑆𝑆 [19].  
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 The policies of POMDPs also vary from those in MDPs. The policy (𝜋𝜋) in a 
POMDP is a mapping from the belief space to actions instead of a mapping from states to 
actions found in MDPs and is represented by  𝜋𝜋 = 𝐵𝐵 → 𝐴𝐴  [12]. It determines the action at 
belief 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 by  𝜋𝜋(𝑏𝑏) ∈ 𝐴𝐴 [13].The belief space is a probability distribution over 𝑆𝑆 that 
includes a history of action and observation pairs and is updated after every decision epoch 
𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 = 𝜏𝜏(𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡−1,𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡, 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡) [13]. The values of policies are also different in POMDPs and are 
represented by 
𝑉𝑉π(𝑏𝑏) = 𝐸𝐸 ��  
∞
𝑡𝑡=0
𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅�𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡,𝜋𝜋(𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡)� | 𝑏𝑏0  =  𝑏𝑏�  [13].                          (5) 
The goal of POMDPs, just as with MDPs, is to maximize long term total discounted 
reward, and one method used to solve them is known as value iteration. Value iteration is 
reasoning back in time to determine the sequence of optimal actions instead of working 
optimally towards a goal [13]. Value iteration is performed using a modified version of the 





𝑏𝑏(𝑠𝑠)𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠,𝑎𝑎) + 𝛾𝛾�  
𝑧𝑧∈𝑍𝑍
𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧|𝑏𝑏,𝑎𝑎)𝑉𝑉∗�𝜏𝜏(𝑏𝑏,𝑎𝑎, 𝑧𝑧)��   [13].         (6) 
With large POMDPs, this solution becomes computationally intractable due to the 
“curse of dimensionality” and the “curse of history” [13]. The “curse of dimensionality” 
refers to the size of the belief space growing exponentially as the number of state variables 
grows, and the “curse of history” refers to the action-observation histories growing 
exponentially with the planning horizon [13].  
E. POMDP SOLUTION METHODS 
Offline planning and online planning are the two primary approaches to solving 
POMDPs [13]. There are difficulties in scaling to large POMDPs with offline planning 
because they must plan for all beliefs and future contingencies when determining the 
optimal policy, which yields extremely large search spaces that are difficult to work with 
[13]. With online planning, the search space is significantly reduced because planning takes 
place locally due to the optimal action being chosen for only the current belief through a 
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lookahead search in the neighborhood of that local belief [13]. Because online planning 
works with smaller state spaces, it is able to solve much larger POMDPs. This thesis relies 
on the concepts of online planning for solving POMDPs. 
In online planning, the agent starts in an initial belief state, 𝑏𝑏0, and searches for an 
optimal action, 𝑎𝑎∗ [13]. Once the agent takes the action, it receives a new observation, and 
updates its belief state based on its most recent action observation pair [13]. At every 
decision epoch, the belief space is updated using Bayes’ rule by recording action 
observation pairs according to 
𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡(𝑠𝑠′) = 𝜂𝜂 · 𝑂𝑂(𝑠𝑠′,𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡, 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡)�  
𝑠𝑠∈𝑆𝑆
 𝑇𝑇(𝑠𝑠,𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡, 𝑠𝑠′) · 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡−1(𝑠𝑠)  [13],                         (7) 
where 𝜂𝜂 is a normalizing constant and the belief at time 𝑡𝑡 is represented by 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡.   
There are multiple methods of conducting online planning to solve POMDPs 
including Monte Carlo sampling, heuristic search, and branch-and-bound pruning [13]. 
The disadvantage to most online planning algorithms is that they represent the belief as a 
probability over the state space, which limits the size of POMDPs they can solve [13]. Both 
Partially Observable Monte-Carlo Planning (POMCP) and DESPOT are online planning 
algorithms that rely heavily on Monte Carlo sampling; however, both algorithms avoid this 
disadvantage by representing their beliefs as a set of sampled states [13]. POMCP is unique 
in that it uses a Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS), which is a heuristic search algorithm, on 
a belief tree to find the optimal policy [13]. This is good for large POMDPs because the 
heuristic nature of the search algorithm significantly reduces the search space, but the 
results can be inaccurate due to overfitting caused by being misguided by the upper 
confidence bound of the heuristic [13]. DESPOT is very similar to the POMCP approach; 
however, it incorporates all three methods of online planning and alleviates overfitting by 
the use of regularization [13]. DESPOT is the method used to solve POMDPs in this thesis. 
F. DESPOT 
DESPOT is a sparse approximation of standard belief tree that focuses online 
planning on capturing the execution of all policies using a set of randomly sampled 
scenarios, K, rather than all possible scenarios [13]. A scenario is a unique trajectory of the 
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execution of a policy that is determinized by a random set of numbers [13]. A DESPOT 
tree contains only the action observation histories under K sampled scenarios but converges 
to the standard belief tree as 𝐾𝐾 → ∞ [13]. By choosing K scenarios instead of all scenarios, 
DESPOT samples both states and observations from a belief tree, preventing each from 
growing exponentially, which alleviates both the “curse of dimensionality” and the “curse 
of history” [13]. The policy obtained by using DESPOT is proven to be near-optimal and 
approaches the optimal policy as 𝐾𝐾 → ∞, where K is defined as 
𝐾𝐾 ∈ 𝑂𝑂�|π|ln(|π||𝐴𝐴||𝑍𝑍|)�  [13].                                           (8)   
A picture of both a standard belief tree and a DESPOT are shown in Figure 5. The 
starting node on a DESPOT belief tree represents the initial belief and every following 
node represents updated belief states [13]. Each belief node branches into action edges that 
further branch into observation edges leading to a new belief state. DESPOT performs a 
lookahead search on the tree at the initial belief for a policy that maximizes the value 
function in order to find the optimal action [13]. At each belief node on the tree, the 
Bellman equation is applied to maximize the value function to find the optimal policy [13]. 
A post order traversal is performed on the belief tree, solving the Bellman equation at each 
node [13]. This method is very similar to value iteration as it is working backwards from 
the bottom of the tree to find the maximum value at each node that will lead to an optimal 
action for 𝑏𝑏0.   
 
Figure 5. Standard Belief Tree and DESPOT. Source: [13]. 
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Two notable features of DESPOT are that it uses sampling and anytime heuristic 
search [13]. Anytime heuristic search, which constructs the DESPOT incrementally under 
a heuristic, speeds up lookahead search and allows the algorithm to output the highest 
valued action with a partially constructed DESPOT under limited planning time [13]. 
Because DESPOT speeds up lookahead search, which sometimes overfits sampled 
scenarios resulting in a non-optimal policy, DESPOT employs regularization to balance 
the estimated value of a policy using sampled scenarios and policy size [13]. These 
characteristics together give DESPOT an advantage over other online planning algorithms 
and are the reason it was chosen as the solution method in this thesis. 
G. SUMMARY 
In summary, we discussed the importance of the intrusion kill chain, the advantages 
of moving target detection techniques, Markov decision processes to include POMDPs, 
and widely used MDP and POMDP solution methods to include the anytime online 
algorithm, DESPOT. Each of these topics are integral to understanding the research 
presented in this thesis. 
Chapter III will discuss the method used to model our attack and defense scenarios 
involving the intrusion kill chain and moving target defense techniques as well as the 
method used to optimize the implementation of MTD techniques.  
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III. OPTIMIZATION OF MOVING TARGET DEFENSE 
TECHNIQUES 
A background of the intrusion kill chain, MTD, Markov decision processes, 
partially observable Markov decision processes, and DESPOT were discussed in Chapter 
II. Here we will discuss the cyber defense scenario on which our model is based as well as 
the method used to develop that model and solve it with the objective of optimizing the 
moving target defense techniques within it. 
A. OPTIMIZATION METHOD 
In order to develop a method of optimizing MTD techniques, it is necessary to 
define the cyber defense scenario on which our model is based. We aim to model the 
defense of a protected network against the progression of a cyber-attack and to analyze that 
defense in terms of cost/benefit of the defender, similar to [6]. The dynamic defense model 
describing our scenario is pictured in Figure 6 and is very closely related to the model 
described in [20]. In the case that a complex cyber-attack occurs, such as an APT attack, 
the attacker will work within the cyber network to attack a protected network, which 
typically includes an intrusion detection system (IDS) [20]. Once the protected network is 
breached, the IDS system is alerted and sends indications to the protected system, or 
defender, to initiate defenses, or actions [20]. 
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Figure 6. Dynamic Defense Model. Adapted from [20]. 
In this thesis, the attacker works through the cyber network or environment to attack 
a defender, after which the defender initiates actions in defense according to observations 
it receives. We do not include an IDS of the typical nature in this thesis; however, the 
model we use provides a way for the defender to receive observations concerning the state 
of its network similarly to how an intrusion detection system provides indications. The 
attack resembles a cyber-attack that follows the framework of the intrusion kill chain, and 
defensive actions resemble MTD techniques. The MTD techniques interrupt the cyber-
attack in order to impede the progress of the attack and defend the protected network. In 
order to model this cyber defense scenario in such a way that allows for the defender actions 
to be optimized in an uncertain environment, we will collect data and explore possible 
modeling solutions. 
The method by which the cyber defense scenario is modeled and solved with the 
objective of optimizing MTD techniques is depicted in Figure 7. This method is comprised 
of four steps: model development, model solution, analysis of results, and an evaluation of 
whether or not optimization is achieved. If optimization is achieved, the MTD techniques 
have been optimized and the method ends; however, if optimization is not achieved, it is 
recommended to return to model development and repeat the method with modifications 
to each step until optimization is achieved. 
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Figure 7. Method of Approach 
Each of the steps in the method of approach are integral in optimizing MTD 
techniques. In model development, we aim to develop a model that incorporates every 
aspect of the cyber defense scenario. In model solution, we choose an existing solution 
method that is best fit to solve our model. In analysis of results, we plan to analyze the 
results from the solution method to determine how well our developed model and solution 
method lead to meeting our objectives. With those results, we will be able to determine if 
the MTD techniques are optimized in our model. If the techniques are not optimized, 
optimization improvement can be performed by going back to model development and 
modifying each of the subsequent steps. In this thesis, optimization improvement involves 
ideas for future work to further improve the results. 
B. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
The model development for this thesis is three-fold: creating an attack model that 
depicts the steps involved in network intrusion followed by an attack, creating a defense 
model that includes network level MTD techniques, and creating a POMDP model that 
combines both the attack and defense models. Both the attack and defense models 
developed adhere very closely to the model employed in [6]. Our attack model depicts the 
process an attacker typically follows before launching a successful attack on a defender 
and includes five distinct states: start, target scan, vulnerability scan, exploit launch, and 
attack [4]. Our defense model includes two types of MTD techniques tailored to network 
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defense. In theory, moving target defense techniques can be implemented at any point in 
our attack model in order to delay the attacker by rendering some of his/her collected 
information obsolete [4]. In this thesis, the state of the defender system will correlate with 
the state the attacker is in because the state of the defender system from the defense 
perspective is the extent to which he/she is being attacked.   
1. Attack Model 
The attack model we propose in this thesis adheres very closely to the intrusion kill 
chain as well as to the model developed in [4]. The sequence of states for our attack model 
is depicted in Figure 8. The start state is a neutral state in which the attacker is not actively 
trying to gain any information on or attack the defender. If the attacker starts the process 
of launching an attack, it will transition to the target scan state. The target scan state is 
where the attacker conducts a survey of the defender ports in search of ones that are open 
to accepting packets and facilitating some type of network service [4]. If the attacker finds 
one or more open ports, it transitions to the vulnerability state, which is where the attacker 
surveys the services running on those ports in search of ones that are vulnerable [4]. If the 
attacker is successful in finding a vulnerable service, it transitions to the exploit launch 
state, which is where the attacker attempts to gain a connection with that service [4]. 
Finally, if the attacker is successful in connecting to a vulnerable service, and therefore the 
defender, it transitions to the attack state [4]. The attack state is where the attacker utilizes 
its connection to the host through the server in order to launch an attack and compromise 
the defender system [4].  
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Figure 8. Attack Sequence. Adapted from [4].   
Similar to [6], we built a Markov model of attack progress, aligning states to the 
phases of attack in [4]. Our attack model, depicted in Figure 9, is a Markov chain including 
the states depicted in Figure 8.  The states, 𝑆𝑆0, 𝑆𝑆1, 𝑆𝑆2, 𝑆𝑆3, 𝑆𝑆4, stand for start, target scan, 
vulnerability scan, exploit launch, and attack, respectively.  If the attacker is successful in 
each of the states, the attack progression will proceed directly from state 𝑆𝑆0 to 𝑆𝑆4; however, 
if the attacker fails to achieve its goal in any of the states, it will remain in the same state 
before continuing towards 𝑆𝑆4 as shown in Figure 8.  Figure 9 depicts the state transitions 
as transition probabilities, where 𝑝𝑝01, for example, represents the probability of 





Figure 9. Attack Model. Adapted from [6] 
2. Defense Model 
The attack model in Figure 9 provides a framework on which MTD techniques can 
be implemented in order to delay or completely thwart an attack. The two MTD techniques 
we use in our defense model are IP reconfigurations and service reconfigurations, both of 
which affect the network dynamics of a protected system. IP reconfigurations randomize 
the IP address of a system that make port scanning impossible for the attacker until it 
regains the new IP address [4]. Service reconfigurations randomize the services a system 
is using that can render the vulnerable services that the attacker is using to compromise it 
obsolete [4]. Both reconfigurations make it difficult for the attacker to succeed; however, 
IP reconfigurations are tailored towards the target scan state and service reconfigurations 
are tailored towards the vulnerability state [4]. A Markov chain of the complete attack and 
defense model is depicted in Figure 10.   If an IP reconfiguration occurs and is successful, 
and the model is in the 𝑆𝑆1 state, the model will transition back to 𝑆𝑆0 with the transition 
probability 𝑝𝑝10. Likewise, if a service reconfiguration occurs and is successful, and the 
model is in the 𝑆𝑆2 state, the model will fall back to 𝑆𝑆1 with the transition probability 𝑝𝑝21. 
 
Figure 10. Attack/Defense Model. Adapted from [6]. 
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3. POMDP 
We propose a POMDP model in this thesis in order to facilitate the attack/defense 
model in Figure 10 as well as to facilitate optimal decision making in an uncertain 
environment.  A schematic depicting the components of a POMDP and how the 
components relate to one another is shown in Figure 11.  In a POMDP process, the agent 
makes decisions based on policies (𝜋𝜋) and the belief state (𝐵𝐵), and these decisions result 
in actions that affect the both the environment in which the agent is residing, defined by 
states (𝑆𝑆) and transition probabilities, and the agent in the form of a reward/cost due to the 
effect the action has on its own system [11]. Every time an action is taken, the belief state 
is updated based on the previous action-observation pair and the process repeats [11].   
 
Figure 11. Schematic Diagram of a General POMDP Model. Adapted 
from [11]. 
The schematic of the proposed POMDP model for this thesis is depicted in 
Figure 12, and it follows the organization of the schematic shown in Figure 11. In our 
POMDP model, the agent is referred to as a defender who takes defensive actions to protect 
its network. The environment resembles a cyber network in which the attacker is able to 
reach the defender. The defender actions are carried out in the form of MTD techniques 
and are based on the observations the defender is receiving as well as the history of action-
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observation pairs contained in the belief state, B. These actions affect the progression of 
the attack and therefore the cyber network, which in turn affects the defender in terms of 
both observations and costs. The costs to the defender are in the form of seconds detracting 
from system availability due to the time it takes to conduct MTD techniques. 
 
Figure 12. Schematic Diagram of the Proposed POMDP Model. 
Adapted from [6]. 
The POMDP model we present in this thesis is an infinite-horizon discounted 
POMDP.  It is infinite-horizon in that it continues in time without a defined ending point, 
and it is discounted in that rewards in the future are valued less than present awards 
according to the discount variable, 𝛾𝛾 [9]. The Markov chain for our infinite-horizon 
discounted POMDP model is depicted in Figure 13. In addition to the attack/defense model 
depicted in Figure 10, it includes attack recovery delay states to resemble attack recovery 
time and to allow the model to continue to cycle without a defined ending point, as well as 
additional transition probabilities to reflect that the attack is not limited to progressing 
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 .                                         (9) 
 
Figure 13. The State-Transition Diagram of the Proposed POMDP 
Model. Adapted from [6]. 
The state variables and observation variables in this POMDP model are very similar 
to one another. The states include 𝑆𝑆0 through 𝑆𝑆4, as well as the recovery delay states. The 
observation variables only include 𝑆𝑆0 through 𝑆𝑆4.  In our POMDP model, the state of the 
system is observed by the defender, and the attack recovery delay states are all observed as 
an attack.  
The action variables and cost variables in our POMDP model are closely related. 
The actions represent the MTD techniques described as part of the defense model pictured 
in Figure 10 and include three actions: nil, IP reconfiguration, and service reconfiguration. 
The action nil is when the defender conducts neither an IP reconfiguration or a service 
reconfiguration. Cost variables are directly related to the action variables as each of the 
actions, except for nil, take time to conduct and come with a cost to the defender in terms 
of network downtime. A cost is also incurred by the defender when an attack occurs, and 
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it represents the idea that network downtime could result from an attack in a cyber-defense 
scenario. 
The discount factor, 𝛾𝛾, describes how immediate costs are valued in comparison 
with future costs when calculating the long term total discounted reward as shown in 
Equation 4 [9].  We propose using a large discount variable close to 1 because, although 
preventing an attack in the present is most important, we consider preventing both present 
and future attacks in our cyber-defense scenario and model to be vital for the optimization 
of moving target defense techniques.   
The transition probabilities, 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, are action dependent conditional probabilities that 
describe the state transitions of the POMDP model [11]. The transition probabilities of our 
POMDP model will be calculated using the data and results presented in [5]. The work 
presented in [5] describes the likelihood that a port scan or a vulnerability scan precedes 
an attack. These likelihoods directly relate to our attack model as our attack model includes 
target scans and vulnerability scans.  In this thesis, a target scan is synonymous with a port 
scan. Once calculated, the transition probabilities used in our model stay the same 
throughout the course of our research.       
The observation probabilities in our POMDP model describe the likelihood that the 
defender is able to observe the true state of the system, and these probabilities change 
throughout cyber activity and form the basis for different variations of our POMDP model. 
Similarly to transition probabilities, the observation probabilities are contained within an 
observation matrix where the columns represent the observations and the rows represent 
the states. By changing the observation probabilities, it is possible to determine how well 
the moving target defense techniques are optimized in both fully observable cases and 
partially observable cases with varying levels of uncertainty.   
C. MODEL SOLUTION 
We propose DESPOT as the solution method for the POMDP model because of its 
notable features that make it a superior online planning algorithm as described in Chapter 
II [6]. In order to achieve our objectives, we plan to first solve the POMDP model with full 
observability to obtain the optimal policy and then to solve modifications of that POMDP 
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model with uncertainty using DESPOT as implemented in [21]. We create three different 
modifications of the POMDP model with full observability by changing the observation 
matrix each time to represent three different scenarios in which detection or miss detection 
is more likely.   
In order to obtain the best possible results with DESPOT, we plan to test a few of 
the many default parameters belonging to the algorithm before we solve any of the POMDP 
models. Many of the parameters may be altered by the user in order to best adapt the 
algorithm to the POMDP being solved, and the parameters that are of interest to us are 
summarized in Table 1. The parameters in Table 1 include Decision Time, Search Depth, 
and Particles, each with their respective default values and descriptions [21]. Decision time 
is the time allotted for each decision epoch, and it is crucial that there is enough time for 
the algorithm to make the best decision. Search depth refers to the length of the search tree 
and describes how far into the future the algorithm will lookahead. Particles describe the 
size of the belief state and how many observation and action pairs from the history of all 
pairs will be considered for future decisions. Each of these parameters are very important 
to this research as they are key elements in solving the POMDP model as well as key 
elements that we might need to change for DESPOT to work favorably in our research.  
Table 1. DESPOT Parameters of Interest. Adapted from [21]. 
Parameter Default Value Description 
Decision Time (seconds) 1 Time allotted for each decision 
Search Depth 90 Depth of the search tree 
Particles 500 
Particles used to represent the belief 
state 
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D. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Once we solve each of our POMDP models with DESPOT, we will use the concepts 
of optimal policy, limiting state probabilities, attack percentage, cost, and availability to 
analyze our results. The optimal policy of the POMDP model with full observability will 
serve as a control model and allow for the comparison of each of the modified POMDP 
models. In order to understand the theoretical percentage of attacks that could be prevented 
if defenses are used optimally, we will use the concept of limiting state probabilities. This 
will allow us to have a baseline for determining how well the defenses are employed in 
each of the POMDP models tested with DESPOT. Finally, the parameters of percentage of 
attacks prevented, cost in terms of network downtime, and network availability will all be 
used to determine if the advantages of MTD techniques were being maximized and undue 
cost was minimized. 
E. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we discussed the cyber defense scenario on which our research is 
based as well as the method we use to optimize MTD techniques to include model 
development, model solution, and analysis of results. Chapter IV will discuss the 
implementation of this method and the analysis of results. 
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IV. RESULTS 
The methodology described in Chapter III is implemented in this chapter. This 
chapter is divided into two sections. The first section describes the POMDP model, its 
optimal policy, and limiting state probabilities, and the second section details the 
simulation and presents the results.   
A. POMDP MODEL 
The POMDP model developed in this thesis follows the format of an infinite-
horizon discounted POMDP as described in Chapter III.  Appendix A contains the POMDP 
xml file that formats the model for ingest into DESPOT, developed from the template 
provided by [21]. This section details each of our POMDP model components, 
including  𝑆𝑆,𝐴𝐴,𝑍𝑍,𝑇𝑇,𝑂𝑂,𝑅𝑅, and 𝛾𝛾, as well as a summary of those components and the optimal 
policy for the POMDP.  
1. Variables 
The set of states and observations in our POMDP model are identical to those 
described as part of the POMDP model shown in Figure 13, with the addition of expanding 
the set of states to include distinct recovery delay states for added time delay within the 
model.  We expanded the attack recovery delay states into 4 separate states, 𝑆𝑆5 through 𝑆𝑆8, 
as depicted in Figure 14.  In this thesis, the attack recovery delay states incur no cost to the 
system and all have transition probabilities of 1. It is the transitions themselves between 
the attack recovery delay states that cause the time delay in our model, representing the 
idea that it takes a network time to recover from an attack.  Each transition, regardless of 
the transition probabilities belonging to them, requires time to execute.  By adding four 
attack recovery delay states, we were able to create this time delay while ensuring that it 
did not outlast the attack progression itself. 
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Figure 14.  POMDP Model with Recovery Delay States. 
Adapted from [6]. 
The set of actions in our POMDP model are identical to those described as part of 
the POMDP model in Figure 13.  The rewards for our POMDP model exist in the form of 
cost in seconds to the system that affect the availability of the network.  The three actions 
in our POMDP model include nil, IP reconfiguration, and service reconfiguration, all of 
which are associated with costs that were developed using the research presented in 
Connell et al. [4]. The costs of the actions, nil, IP reconfiguration, and service 
reconfiguration, are 0 seconds, -0.635 seconds, and -9.95 seconds, respectively [4]. There 
is also a cost incurred to the system when it is attacked to represent the impact an attack 
would have on a protected cyber network in terms of recovery time. We chose a cost of -
695 seconds for each attack because the cost of an attack needed to be much larger than 
either an IP or service reconfiguration to emphasize its impact on the system.  However, 
we also ensured the cost of an attack was not so large that IP and service reconfigurations 
would be employed constantly due to their costs being insignificant compared to an attack.  
Each of the costs employed in this thesis were chosen in order to allow the system to reach 
an optimized performance. 
We chose 𝛾𝛾 to be 0.95 for our POMDP model. With a high discount variable of 
0.95, both immediate and future rewards were highly valued, with immediate rewards 
being valued only slightly higher than future rewards.  
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2. Transition Probabilities 
In this thesis, the transition probabilities describe both the likelihood that the 
attacker will or will not proceed forward through the stages of the intrusion kill chain and 
the likelihood that the attacker will have to take a step back if defensive action is taken.  
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                         (10) 
We calculated the transition probabilities for the POMDP model in Figure 14 based on the 
data presented in both [4] and [5], similarly to the method used in [6]. The data presented 
in [5] was collected in order to determine if port scans, ICMP scans, and vulnerability scans 
are precursors to an attack [5]. In this thesis, we group port scans and ICMP scans into one 
group called target scans because an IP reconfiguration can derail the progress of either of 
these types of scans. The data we used from [5] includes attack data from a 48-day study 
where both management traffic, which is accepted as normal traffic, and malicious activity 
were observed on a subnet including 2 target computers [5]. First, each type of scan was 
classified by the number of packets involved in the connection in order to be able to 
distinguish between the different scans [5]. There was a total of 908,963 packets of 
malicious and management traffic analyzed, and of those packets, 59,468 were determined 
to be malicious [5]. Of the malicious packets, 22,170 were found to include ICMP scans, 
port scans, vulnerability scans, and attacks directed towards the target computers, 20,675 
of which were precursors to an attack [5]. It was also determined that there was a total of 
760 attacks that occurred throughout this study on the two target computers, 50% of which 
were preceded by port, ICMP, or vulnerability scans. This data is summarized in Table 3. 
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Table 2. Summary of Total Malicious Packets and Scans. Adapted from [5]. 
Total packets observed 908,963 
Total malicious packets 59,468 
Total port, ICMP, and vulnerability scans 22,170 
Total scans leading to an attack 20,675 
Total attacks 760 
Total attacks preceded by scans 380 
 
The findings presented in [5] are grouped into two sections: one describing the 
number of different scans preceding attacks and the other describing the number of attacks 
preceded by different types of scans [5]. We summarized this data into Venn diagrams that 
are pictured in Figures 15 and 16. The Venn diagram in Figure 15 depicts the number of 
distinct port, ICMP, and vulnerability scans as well as the combination of these scans that 
preceded attacks.  The Venn diagram in Figure 16 depicts the number of attacks that were 
preceded by distinct scans as well as combinations of scans. For the purpose of our 
research, we combined the port and ICMP scans into one group of target scans in the Venn 
diagrams on the right in both figures, as IP reconfigurations target both port and ICMP 
scans.  
 
Figure 15. Scans Preceding Attacks. Adapted from [5]. 
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Figure 16.  Number of Attacks Preceded by Scans. Adapted from [5]. 
We calculated the transition probabilities that account for the effect of defensive 
action being taken, such as IP reconfigurations and service reconfigurations, using the data 
presented in [4]. The experiments conducted in [4] to determine how successful MTDs 
were in thwarting attacks were run under the constraints that there were 256 available IP 
addresses, similar to a /24 network, and that there were three web services available to the 
host [4].  In this thesis, we operated under the same constraints assuming that there were 
256 available IP addresses and 3 web services available to the defender.  Thus, for our 
POMDP model, we calculated 𝑝𝑝10,𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 to be 255/256 and 𝑝𝑝21,𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 to be 2/3 [4]. These 
probabilities account for the possibility of the attacker choosing the exact same IP address 
or service that the defender “randomly” switched to during a reconfiguration. Although IP 
and service reconfigurations are transparent to the defender conducting them, these 
reconfigurations appear random to the attacker. 
As transition probabilities vary according to actions, in our POMDP model, 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑁𝑁 
represents probabilities when no action is taken, 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 represents probabilities when an IP 
reconfiguration occurs, and 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 represents probabilities when a service reconfiguration 
occurs. There are four transition probabilities stemming from the start state: 𝑝𝑝00,𝑝𝑝01, 𝑝𝑝02, 
𝑝𝑝03.  Neither service nor IP reconfigurations affect the start state of the attack model; thus, 
the probabilities stemming from the start state remain the same even if a reconfiguration is 
conducted while in the state.  The start-state transition probabilities were calculated as 
follows [5]:   
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 𝑝𝑝00,𝑁𝑁 = 𝑝𝑝00,𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 = 𝑝𝑝00,𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 = 1 − 𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠:𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 , (11) 
𝑝𝑝01,𝑁𝑁 = 𝑝𝑝01,𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 = 𝑝𝑝01,𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 =
�𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 × 𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠:𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�
�𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐  + 𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎|𝑠𝑠�
 ,                                (12) 
𝑝𝑝02,𝑁𝑁 = 𝑝𝑝02,𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 = 𝑝𝑝02,𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 =
�𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐  × 𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠:𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�
�𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐  + 𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎|𝑠𝑠�
 ,                                (13) 
𝑝𝑝03,𝑁𝑁 = 𝑝𝑝03,𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 = 𝑝𝑝03,𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 =
�𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎|𝑠𝑠 × 𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠:𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�
�𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐  + 𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎|𝑠𝑠�
 ,                                (14) 
where 𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠:𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 is the ratio of total scans preceding an attack (20675) to total malicious packets 
(59,468), 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 is the total target scans preceding attacks (3760), 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐  is the unique 
vulnerability scans preceding attacks (1399), and 𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎|𝑠𝑠 is the total attacks preceded by scans 
(380). 
 There are four transition probabilities stemming from the target scan state: 𝑝𝑝10,𝑝𝑝11, 
𝑝𝑝12, 𝑝𝑝13. Because IP reconfigurations affect the target scan state of the attack model, the 
transition probabilities stemming from the state are also affected. To calculate the transition 
probabilities that account for IP reconfigurations, we multiplied the nil transition 
probabilities by 𝑝𝑝10 [4]. The target scan state transition probabilities were calculated as 
follows [5]:   
𝑝𝑝10,𝑁𝑁 =  𝑝𝑝10,𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 = 0 ,                                                       (15) 
𝑝𝑝12,𝑁𝑁 =  𝑝𝑝12,𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 =
𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠∩𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠
𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠
 ,                                                      (16) 
𝑝𝑝13,𝑁𝑁 =  𝑝𝑝13,𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 =
𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎|𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐
𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠
 ,                                                      (17) 




,                                                             (19) 
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𝑝𝑝11,𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 = �1 − 𝑝𝑝10,𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅� × 𝑝𝑝11,𝑁𝑁 ,                                                (20) 
𝑝𝑝12,𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 = �1 − 𝑝𝑝10,𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅� × 𝑝𝑝12,𝑁𝑁 ,                                                (21) 
𝑝𝑝13,𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 = �1 − 𝑝𝑝10,𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅� × 𝑝𝑝13,𝑁𝑁 ,                                                (22) 
where 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠∩𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠 is the intersection of target scans and vulnerability scans preceding attacks 
(258), 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 is the total target scans preceding attacks (3760), and 𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎|𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐  is the total attacks 
preceded by unique target scans (29). 
There are three transition probabilities stemming from the vulnerability scan state: 
𝑝𝑝21, 𝑝𝑝22, 𝑝𝑝23.  Because service reconfigurations affect the vulnerability scan state of the 
POMDP model, the transition probabilities stemming from the state are also affected. To 
calculate the transition probabilities that account for service reconfigurations, we 
multiplied the nil transition probabilities by 𝑝𝑝21 [4]. The vulnerability state transition 
probabilities were calculated as follows [5]:  
𝑝𝑝21,𝑁𝑁 =  𝑝𝑝21,𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 = 0 ,                                                      (23) 
𝑝𝑝22,𝑁𝑁 =  𝑝𝑝22,𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 =
(𝜀𝜀𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠 − 𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎|𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠)
𝜀𝜀𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠
 ,                                               (24) 
𝑝𝑝23,𝑁𝑁 =  𝑝𝑝23,𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 =
𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎|𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠
𝜀𝜀𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠




 ,                                                                 (26) 
𝑝𝑝22,𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 = �1 − 𝑝𝑝21,𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅� × 𝑝𝑝22,𝑁𝑁 ,                                              (27) 
𝑝𝑝23,𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 = �1 − 𝑝𝑝21,𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅� × 𝑝𝑝23,𝑁𝑁 ,                                              (28) 
where 𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎|𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠 is the total attacks preceded by vulnerability scans (350), and 𝜀𝜀𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠 is the total 
vulnerability scans preceding attacks (1657). 
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 There are two transition probabilities stemming from the attack state: 𝑝𝑝33, 𝑝𝑝34.  
Because neither service nor IP reconfigurations affect the attack state of the attack model, 
the probabilities stemming from this state remain the same even if a reconfiguration is 
conducted while the model is in the attack state.  The exploit launch state transition 
probabilities were calculated as follows [5]: 
𝑝𝑝33,𝑁𝑁 = 𝑝𝑝33,𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 = 𝑝𝑝33,𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 =
𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎|𝑠𝑠
𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎
 ,                                                   (29) 
𝑝𝑝34,𝑁𝑁 = 𝑝𝑝34,𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 = 𝑝𝑝34,𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 = 1 −  𝑝𝑝33,𝑁𝑁 ,                                          (30) 
where 𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎|𝑠𝑠 is the total attacks preceded by scans (380), and 𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎 is the total attacks (760).   
All of the calculated transition probabilities used in our POMDP model are 
summarized in three 9 × 9 matrices grouped according to action: 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇,𝑁𝑁, 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇,𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼, 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇,𝑆𝑆. The 











0.6523 0.2360 0.08780 0.02391 0 0 0 0 0
0 0.9237 0.06862 0.007713 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0.7888 0.2112 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1




















0.6523 0.2360 0.08780 0.02391 0 0 0 0 0
0 0.9237 0.06862 0.007713 0 0 0 0 0
0 0.6667 0.2629 0.07041 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1





















0.6523 0.2360 0.08780 0.02391 0 0 0 0 0
0.9956 0.004087 0.0003036 0.00003413 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0.7888 0.2112 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1









 .    (33) 
A diagram of the Markov chain for our POMDP model annotated with all of the calculated 
transition probabilities is depicted in Figure 17. The probabilities are color coded according 
to each type of reconfiguration: black represents the nil action, blue represents the service 
reconfiguration action, and red represents the IP reconfiguration action.   
 
Figure 17. Annotated State Transition Diagram with State Transition 
Probabilities as Shown in Equations 31–33. Adapted from [6]. 
3. Limiting State Probabilities 
For the POMDP model in this thesis, defensive actions are not always employed at 
the most effective time due to the defender observations not always being synonymous 
with actual state of the system. Limiting state probabilities allow us to determine the 
percentage of attacks that the defender could prevent if defenses were used optimally. 
Using Equation 2 with each of the transition matrices 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇,𝑁𝑁, 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇,𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅, and 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇,𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅, we determined 
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the limiting state probabilities of the attack state, 𝑝𝑝4,𝑁𝑁, 𝑝𝑝4,𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅, and 𝑝𝑝4,𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 to be 0.0438, 0.0126, 
and 0.0459, respectively. The theoretical percentage of the attacks prevented with service 
reconfigurations is determined as 
𝛼𝛼 = �1 −
𝑝𝑝4,𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅
𝑝𝑝4,𝑁𝑁
� × 100 .                                                  (34) 
Based on Equation 34, the system would suspend 71% of attacks if service reconfigurations 
were the only form of defense available and were employed optimally. Similarly, we 
determined that the system would suspend 0% of attacks if IP reconfigurations were the 
only form of defense available and were employed optimally. In summary, if service 
reconfigurations are employed effectively and there is no uncertainty surrounding the state 
in which the system lies, the system will prevent 71% of attacks. However, solely using IP 
reconfigurations as a defense method will not prevent any attacks within this POMDP 
model.  
4. Observation Probabilities 
The observation matrices of our POMDP model range from a model with full 
observability to three different variations of that model with partial observability, known 
as Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3. The 9 × 5 observability matrix or full observability matrix 











𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷
𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷
𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷
𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷
𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷
𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷
𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷
𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷









 .                                        (35) 
where the probability of detection (𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷) is 1 and the probability of miss detection (𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷) is 
0.  When  𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 = 1 and  𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 = 0, the defender is always certain of the true state of the system. 
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Three cases were considered to model a potential real-world scenario of detecting 
an attack. In these cases, the defender is never certain of the true state of the system in our 
POMDP model; thus, 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 is always less than 1. All three of the cases were studied with 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 
ranging from 0.95 to 0.55 in decrements of 0.10. We set the lower limit of 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 at 0.55 
because at 0.50 there is no difference between using moving target defense with an optimal 
policy and using a periodic defense. We denote the observation matrices for Case 1, Case 2, 

































































































































𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 0 0 0
𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 0 0 0
𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 0 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 0 0
𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 0 0 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 0
𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 0 0 0 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷
𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 0 0 0 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷
𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 0 0 0 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷
𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 0 0 0 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷
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0 0 0 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷
0 0 0 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷
0 0 0 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷












 .                                     (38) 
We refer to 𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂,1 as the “neighbor” case because 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 lies in the neighboring states 
of 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 with the probabilities in all other states equal to 0. In this case, if the defender 
incorrectly observes the state it is in, it will observe a state that is neighboring the true state 
of the system. This error presents a best-case scenario for partial observability. By 
observing a state that is neighboring the true state, the defender is likely to employ defenses 
that would be effective in the true state. For example, if the defender observes it is in state 
𝑆𝑆4 when the true state is actually 𝑆𝑆3, even though the observation is incorrect, the defender 
is still likely to employ a vulnerability scan that would be effective in 𝑆𝑆3. In 𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂,1, even if 
the observation of the state is not synonymous with the true state of the system, there is 
still a chance at defending against a possible imminent attack.  
We refer to 𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂,2 as the “miss detection” case because 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 always lies in 𝑆𝑆0. In this 
case, if the defender incorrectly observes the state it is in, it will observe the start-state. 
When the defender believes it is in the start-state, it believes it is not being attacked to any 
degree and is not likely to employ any type of defense. For example, if the defender 
observes it is in 𝑆𝑆0 when the true state is actually 𝑆𝑆3, it is not likely to conduct a 
reconfiguration and the attack will be likely to progress forward. In 𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂,2, if the observation 
of the state is not synonymous with the true state of the system, the defender will 
completely miss detect the imminent attack and will not be able to defend against it. 
We refer to 𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂,3 as the “combination” case because it is similar to a combination of 
𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂,1 and 𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂,2.  In this case, 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 is divided equally amongst all remaining states and could 
lie in a neighboring state of 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 or in 𝑆𝑆0. If the defender incorrectly observes the state it is 
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in, it is equally likely to observe any other state. In 𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂,3, if the observation of the state is 
not synonymous with the true state of the system, there is both the possibility of completely 
miss detecting an imminent attack and the possibility of detecting an attack and defending 
against it.  
5. Optimal Policy 
The optimal policy for the POMDP model with full observability was determined 
using the Markov Decision Process (MDP) Toolbox in MATLAB (see Appendix B for the 
MATLAB code used in this thesis) [22]. The optimal policy was found to be [N, N, SR, N, 
N] corresponding to states [𝑆𝑆0, 𝑆𝑆1,𝑆𝑆2, 𝑆𝑆3, 𝑆𝑆4], respectively, where the symbols N, SR, and 
IR represent the actions nil (N), service reconfiguration (SR), and IP reconfiguration (IR), 
respectively. This policy shows that it is optimal for the system to conduct a service 
reconfiguration in the vulnerability state and refrain from conducting any reconfigurations 
in all other states.   
In the optimal policy, only service reconfigurations are employed.  Although IP 
reconfigurations were available, they were never selected because a POMDP-based 
approach tailors optimization efforts to defend against the specific attack faced.  In the case 
of attacks presented in our POMDP model, the IP reconfiguration does not offer enough 
return on investment to be included in the optimal policy.  This was expected given the 
assessment of limiting state probabilities considered in Section IV.A.3. Given that an IP 
reconfiguration is more expensive than a service reconfiguration and that it does not reduce 
the time spent in the attack state, it is not useful in our efforts towards optimizing MTD 
techniques.  
B. SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
The simulation phase of this thesis involved determining the DESPOT parameters 
under which our POMDP model performed best, solving the POMDP with full 
observability to verify that it followed the optimal policy, and solving Cases 1, 2, and 3. In 
this section, we discuss the simulation phase as well as the hardware that was used to run 
these simulations, how we processed the data returned by DESPOT, and how we analyzed 
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that data in a way that led us to determine if the moving target defense techniques within 
the models were optimized.   
1. Solving with DESPOT 
Each time we ran DESPOT to solve a POMDP, we manually modified the 
following parameters within the algorithm to meet our desired specifications: the number 
of decisions, particles, search depth, and time per decision. We used a total of 320 CPUs 
divided among 10 Dell R420 servers. Each of the CPUs had between 4 and 8GB RAM, 
and each of the servers belonged to the Intel Xeon family.  
2. Post-processing 
Post-processing involved converting the data that DESPOT returned from each run 
into a format that we are able to analyze in MATLAB. We created a parser in PYTHON 
for this data conversion. DESPOT outputs a standard collection of data for each decision 
epoch that occurs. The parser we created transformed that data into an array format. We 
included the following data in each array: round, step, action, state, observation, and 
reward. For example, if we chose 40,000 decisions for one run with DESPOT, after parsing, 
we would end up with 40,000 arrays.   
3. Data Analysis 
Data analysis involved developing equations and figures to interpret our parsed 
data. We developed three equations to determine the percentage of attacks that were 
prevented, the total cost to the system in seconds, and the total network availability. We 
also created histograms depicting the distributions of actions according to state to 
determine the majority policy for our POMDP model with full observability and for Cases 
1, 2 and 3. 
The estimated percentage of attacks prevented 𝛼𝛼
^
 is determined as 
𝛼𝛼
^




 � × 100,                                                        (39) 
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where 𝜉𝜉𝑎𝑎 is the total number of attacks and 𝜉𝜉𝑑𝑑 is the total number of decision epochs. The 
total number of attacks include only 𝑆𝑆4, as 𝑆𝑆5 → 𝑆𝑆8 are all part of the recovery delay states 
that transition the model back to the start state. Equation 39 is similar to Equation 34; 




The total cost 𝜂𝜂 describes the normalized sum of the cost of defenses employed to 
prevent attacks, and it was determined as 
𝜂𝜂 =
(𝜉𝜉𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 × 𝜂𝜂𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅) + (𝜉𝜉𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 × 𝜂𝜂𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅)
𝜉𝜉𝑑𝑑
,  (40) 
where 𝜉𝜉𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 is the total number of service reconfigurations, 𝜉𝜉𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 is the total number of IP 
reconfigurations, 𝜂𝜂𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 is the cost of a service reconfiguration, 𝜂𝜂𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 is the cost of an IP 
reconfiguration, and 𝜉𝜉𝑑𝑑 is the total number of decision epochs. Cost was determined by 
adding up the total number of service and IP reconfigurations and multiplying by their 
respective costs, and it was normalized by dividing by the total number of decision epochs. 
The percentage availability 𝜈𝜈 describes the percentage of time the network services 
were available to the user, and it was determined as 
𝜈𝜈 =
��𝜁𝜁 − 𝜂𝜂𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝜁𝜁 � × 𝜉𝜉𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅� + ��
𝜁𝜁 − 𝜂𝜂𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅
𝜁𝜁 � × 𝜉𝜉𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅� + (𝜉𝜉𝑁𝑁)
𝜉𝜉𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 + 𝜉𝜉𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 + 𝜉𝜉𝑁𝑁
× 100,  (41) 
where 𝜁𝜁 represents the maximum network availability in between decision epochs,  𝜉𝜉𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 is 
the total number of service reconfigurations, 𝜉𝜉𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 is the total number of IP reconfigurations, 
𝜂𝜂𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 is the cost of a service reconfiguration, 𝜂𝜂𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 is the cost of an IP reconfiguration, and 𝜉𝜉𝑁𝑁 
is the number of nil reconfigurations. In Equation 41, the costs of reconfigurations are 
subtracted from 𝜁𝜁. We chose a value for 𝜁𝜁 to convey that, in our POMDP model, 
reconfigurations cannot be triggered faster than they can be executed and that attacks have 
a severe impact on the system. We used 𝜁𝜁 = 10 because it is the first whole number larger 
than the costs of both types of reconfigurations and because it is significantly smaller than 
the cost of an attack. In our POMDP model, although reconfigurations decrease the overall 
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network availability, they are likely to be employed because the cost of reconfiguring is 
much less than that of being attacked.   
4. Determining DESPOT Parameters 
After solving the POMDP and determining the optimal policy and limiting state 
probabilities, initial simulations were conducted with full observability to determine if 
DESPOT default parameters would produce the best results. In these simulations, we used 
a range of values for the three DESPOT parameters discussed in Table 1: particles, search 
depth, and decision time. These parameters were of interest because they were most likely 
to affect the quality of decisions being made during the simulations. 
The default parameters for particles, search depth, and decision time are 500, 90, 
and 1, respectively. We tested four categories of parameters: default parameters, reduced 
particles and depth, reduced particles, and reduced depth.  We also tested each of these 
categories with different decision times ranging from 1 to 5 seconds in increments of 1. 
The parameters for each of the categories are shown in Table 3.   
Table 3. Categories of DESPOT Parameters Tested 








50 10 1,2,3,4,5 40,000 
Reduced 
Particles 50 90 1,2,3,4,5 40,000 
Reduced 




The results of testing each category of parameters described in Table 3 are shown 
in Figures 18 through 20. The results were analyzed in terms of percentage attacks, absolute 
value of cost, and percentage availability. The analysis of percentage attacks versus 
decision time in Figure 18 does not show a significant difference between any of the 
categories, as the attack percentages remained fairly constant around 70%. The analysis of 
the absolute value of the cost versus decision time in Figure 19 shows that the lowest cost 
is achieved with default parameters, followed by reduced depth, then by reduced particles, 
and lastly by reduced particles and depth. The analysis of percentage availability versus 
decision time in Figure 20 shows that the highest availability is achieved with default 
parameters, once again followed by reduced depth, then by reduced particles, and lastly by 
reduced particles and depth. The same trend is observed for both the cost and availability 
analysis showing that default parameters perform best with our simulations by allowing 
the highest quality decision making.   
 
Figure 18. Comparison of Percentage Attacks as a Function of 




Figure 19. Comparison of Absolute Value of Cost as a Function of 
Decision Time for a Range of DESPOT Parameter Values as Specified in 
Table 3 
 
Figure 20. Comparison of Percentage Availability as a Function of 
Decision Time for a Range of DESPOT Parameter Values as Specified in 
Table 3 
47 
5. Verification of Optimal Policy 
Once we determined that default DESPOT parameters performed best with our 
simulations, we used DESPOT to solve the POMDP with full observability using 40,000 
decision epochs. In order to determine the policy that decision making followed during this 
run, we obtained a normalized histogram representing the estimated probabilities of the 
actions that occurred in each state within the set of 40,000 decision epochs.  From these 
histograms, we were able to determine the action that occurred most frequently in each 
state, which we refer to collectively as the majority policy. These histograms are depicted 
in Figure 21 in order of  𝑆𝑆0 → 𝑆𝑆4, from left to right. The data in Figure 21 is summarized 
in Table 4. This data shows that the majority policy for this data is [N, N, SR, N, N], which 
is synonymous with the optimal policy. This data also shows that IP reconfigurations never 
occurred in any of the states, which was expected based on the analysis of the optimal 
policies in Section IV.A.5. This test was used as a control in this thesis because it proved 
that DESPOT was able to optimize moving target defense techniques by following the 
optimal policy before uncertainty was added to the POMDP model.   
 
Figure 21. Estimated Probabilities of Actions by State for the POMDP 
Model with Full Observability (i.e., 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 = 1) 
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Table 4. Summary of the Relative Probabilities of Each Action in Figure 21 
and the Majority Policy 
𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 States 
𝑆𝑆0 𝑆𝑆1 𝑆𝑆2 𝑆𝑆3 𝑆𝑆4 
Actions Actions Actions Actions Actions 
N SR IR N SR IR N SR IR N SR IR N SR IR 
1.00 0.93 0.07 0 0.95 0.05 0 0 1.00 0 0.92 0.08 0 0.94 0.06 0 
Majority Policy: [N, N, SR, N, N] 
6. Testing Uncertainty Models
Once the optimal policy was verified for the POMDP model with full observability, 
we used DESPOT to solve Cases 1, 2, and 3 using 40,000 decisions each. We solved each 
case with 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 ranging from 0.95 to 0.55 in decrements of 0.10. We analyzed the data in 
terms of attack percentage, cost, availability, and majority policy to understand how the 
addition of uncertainty affected decision making. 
a. Attack percentage, Cost, and Availability Analysis
Plots for percentage attacks, absolute value of cost, and percentage availability 
versus 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 for Cases 1, 2, and 3 are shown in Figures 22 through 24.  The percentage attacks 
analysis in Figure 22 showed that even as 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 decreased from 0.95 to 0.55, the percentage 
of attacks prevented remained around 70%. The cost analysis in Figure 23 showed that as 
𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 decreased, the absolute value of the cost increased from about 0.04 at the lowest point 
to about 0.18 at the highest point. The percentage availability analysis in Figure 24 showed 
that as 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 decreased, the availability increased from about 94.5% at the lowest point to 
98.7% at the highest point.  
In all three cases, as 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 decreased, the percentage of attacks remained about the 
same, the absolute value of the cost increased, and the percentage availability decreased.  
These trends show that as 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 decreased, the defender was less certain of the true state of 
the system requiring it to reconfigure more often and not always at the most effective time. 
A steady trend for attack percentage around 70% indicates that although the defender 
reconfigured more often, the increase in cost was due to more reconfigurations occurring 
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and not more attacks occurring; therefore, the increase in the defender reconfigurations was 
effective at preventing attacks at the expense of increased cost and decreased availability. 
Moreover, the defender was able to continue to prevent a similar percentage of attacks as 
the theoretical percentage calculated for service reconfigurations using Equation 34. It is 
notable that Case 2, the ‘miss detection’ case, performed the best out of all three cases with 
the lowest cost and highest availability.  Additionally, for each of the three cases, there is 
a sharp increase in absolute value of the cost and sharp decrease in availability around 
𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 = 0.75 indicating that DESPOT becomes less effective at optimizing MTD techniques 
within our POMDP model at this point. 
 
Figure 22. Comparison of Percentage Attacks as a Function of  𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 for 
Cases 1, 2, and 3 as Specified in Equations 36, 37, and 38 
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Figure 23. Comparison of Absolute Value of Cost as a Function of 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 
for Cases 1, 2, and 3 as Specified in Equations 36, 37, and 38 
 
Figure 24. Comparison of Percentage Availability as a Function of 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 
for Cases 1, 2, and 3 as Specified in Equations 36, 37, and 38 
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b. Policy Analysis
In order to determine the policy that decision making followed for each 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 tested 
for Cases 1, 2, and 3, we estimated the probabilities of the actions (i.e. normalized 
histogram values) that occurred in each state within each set of 40,000 decision epochs 
similar to that of Figure 21. A summary of the estimated probabilities for each action as 
well as the majority policy for each 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 tested for Cases 1, 2, and 3 is depicted in Tables 5, 
6, and 7. For each case and each 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 level, the majority policy aligns with one of three types 
of policies: the optimal policy, a periodic policy, or a policy falling somewhere in between 
the optimal policy and a periodic policy.  In our POMDP model, the optimal policy is 
represented by [N, N, SR, N, N], whereas a periodic policy is represented by [SR, SR, SR, 
SR, SR].  In the optimal policy, the defender conducts a reconfiguration in the 𝑆𝑆2 state 
only; however, in a periodic policy, the defender disregards the optimal policy and 
conducts reconfigurations at fixed intervals due to uncertainty surrounding the true state of 
the system. Results for Case 1 in Table 5 show that the majority of decisions were made 
following the optimal policy when 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 =  0.95. However, as the uncertainty level increased 
(i.e., as 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 decreased), decision making began to resemble that of a periodic policy as 
service reconfigurations began to make up the majority of actions in states other than just 
𝑆𝑆2. Results for Case 2 in Table 6 followed the same pattern as Case 1; however, the majority 
policy trended towards a periodic policy at a slower rate in Case 2 than Case 1. Results for 
Case 3 in Table 7 followed the same trend as those of Cases 1 and 2; however, the policy 
trended towards a periodic policy the fastest in this case. In Case 3, the policy became 
periodic at 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 =  0.75; whereas, the policy never became fully periodic in Cases 1 and 2.
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Table 5. Summary of the Estimated Probabilities of Actions and the Majority Policies for Each 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 for Case 1 
𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 States 
𝑆𝑆0 𝑆𝑆1 𝑆𝑆2 𝑆𝑆3 𝑆𝑆4 
Actions Actions Actions Actions Actions 
N SR IR N SR IR N SR IR N SR IR N SR IR 
0.95 0.8 0.2 0 0.53 0.47 0 0.03 0.97 0 0.38 0.62 0 0.84 0.16 0 
Majority Policy: [N, N, SR, SR, N] 
0.85 0.63 0.37 0 0.34 0.66 0 0.03 0.97 0 0.33 0.67 0 0.77 0.23 0 
Majority Policy: [N, SR, SR, SR, N] 
0.75 0.71 0.29 0 0.31 0.69 0 0.04 0.96 0 0.3 0.7 0 0.8 0.2 0 
Majority Policy: [N, SR, SR, SR, N] 
0.65 0.59 0.41 0 0.24 0.76 0 0.03 0.97 0 0.32 0.68 0 0.71 0.29 0 
Majority Policy: [N, SR, SR, SR, N] 
0.55 0.47 0.53 0 0.21 0.79 0 0.03 0.97 0 0.33 0.67 0 0.67 0.33 0 
Majority Policy: [SR, SR, SR, SR, N] 
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Table 6. Summary of the Estimated Probabilities of Actions and Majority Policies for Each 𝑝𝑝 𝐷𝐷  for Case 2 
𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 States 
𝑆𝑆0 𝑆𝑆1 𝑆𝑆2 𝑆𝑆3 𝑆𝑆4 
Actions Actions Actions Actions Actions 
N SR IR N SR IR N SR IR N SR IR N SR IR 
0.95 0.6 0.4 0 0.88 0.12 0 0.01 0.99 0 0.87 0.13 0 0.94 0.06 0 
Majority Policy: [N, N, SR, N, N] 
0.85 0.37 0.63 0 0.79 0.21 0 0.02 0.98 0 0.87 0.13 0 0.9 0.1 0 
Majority Policy: [SR, N, SR, N, N] 
0.75 0.39 0.61 0 0.68 0.32 0 0.01 0.99 0 0.79 0.21 0 0.87 0.13 0 
Majority Policy: [SR, N, SR, N, N] 
0.65 0.41 0.59 0 0.56 0.44 0 0.01 0.99 0 0.74 0.26 0 0.84 0.16 0 
Majority Policy: [SR, N, SR, N, N] 
0.55 0.43 0.57 0 0.44 0.56 0 0.01 0.99 0 0.62 0.38 0 0.8 0.2 0 
Majority Policy: [SR, SR, SR, N, N] 
54 
Table 7. Summary of the Estimated Probabilities of Actions and Majority Policies for Each 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 for Case 3 
𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 States 
𝑆𝑆0 𝑆𝑆1 𝑆𝑆2 𝑆𝑆3 𝑆𝑆4 
Actions Actions Actions Actions Actions 
N SR IR N SR IR N SR IR N SR IR N SR IR 
0.95 0.77 0.23 0 0.79 0.21 0 0.02 0.98 0 0.43 0.57 0 0.82 0.18 0 
Majority Policy: [N, N, SR, SR, N] 
0.85 0.53 0.47 0 0.54 0.46 0 0.04 0.96 0 0.26 0.74 0 0.48 0.52 0 
Majority Policy: [N, N, SR, SR, SR] 
0.75 0.35 0.65 0 0.35 0.65 0 0.04 0.96 0 0.15 0.85 0 0.3 0.7 0 
Majority Policy: [SR, SR, SR, SR, SR] 
0.65 0.24 0.76 0 0.23 0.77 0 0.04 0.96 0 0.08 0.92 0 0.13 0.87 0 
Majority Policy: [SR, SR, SR, SR, SR] 
0.55 0.14 0.86 0 0.14 0.86 0 0.04 0.96 0 0.07 0.93 0 0.1 0.9 0 
Majority Policy: [SR, SR, SR, SR, SR] 
 
55 
Although the results from this analysis show that the majority policy varies for each 
case and each 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷, there is a common trend with all three. At lower uncertainty levels, the 
optimal policy, or a policy close to it, is followed, and at higher uncertainty levels, the 
policy becomes more and more periodic.  It is also notable that IP reconfigurations never 
occurred in trials of the system. While this was expected, given the analysis of optimal 
policy analysis at 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 =  1.0 discussed in Section IV.A.5, it serves as additional validation 
that the system can achieve optimized MTD as 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 degrades. Taking all three cases into 
account, at 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 =  0.75, we can no longer trust the system to follow the optimal policy, and 
it is no longer advantageous to use DESPOT to solve the POMDP.  
C. SUMMARY 
The methodology introduced in Chapter 3 was implemented in this chapter in two 
sections. The first section explains the POMDP model in detail to include how we defined 
each aspect of our POMDP model as well as how we determined its optimal policy and 
limiting state probabilities. The second section explains the simulation results to include 
how we solved each of our POMDP cases with DESPOT and the results we obtained from 
the solutions. Consequently, the results show that the majority of decisions in our 
simulations were made following the optimal policy with no uncertainty.  As uncertainty 
increased in Cases 1, 2, and 3, percentage attacks remained almost constant, the absolute 
value of cost increased, percentage availability decreased, and the majority policy became 
more and more periodic.  In each analysis, it was clear that when 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 became 0.75, DESPOT 
did not perform as well at optimizing the MTD techniques within our POMDP model or at 
following the optimal policy.  Therefore, we encourage the use of DESPOT in a cyber-
defense scenario similar to our POMDP model as long as 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 is greater than 0.85.   
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V. CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, we developed a method for optimizing MTD techniques that involved 
developing a model, choosing a solution method, analyzing the results, and determining if 
optimization was achieved.  We followed this method in order to reach our objective of 
optimizing MTD techniques by developing a POMDP model, solving different variations 
of it with DESPOT, and analyzing the results in terms of attack percentage, cost, 
availability percentage, and majority policy. 
A. SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTIONS 
The most significant contribution in this thesis is the development of a POMDP 
model as a framework to optimize MTD techniques and minimize cost. The majority policy 
of the POMDP with full observability was in line with the optimal policy validating that 
this framework is suitable as a platform for optimizing such techniques. Having a valid 
framework that can be modified for the purpose of optimizing cyber defense techniques is 
critical in a world of constantly evolving cyber threats.  
Another contribution is determining the bounds on which DESPOT performs best 
as an MTD controller. The majority policies were closest to the optimal policy allowing 
the system to maximize system availability when 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 > 0.85. However, below 0.85, 
reconfigurations became periodic in nature causing percentage availability to decrease. 
Within the limitations of this research, these findings show that MTD techniques can be 
optimized using a POMDP and that DESPOT offers a valid solution above 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 = 0.85.  
Our results suggest that performance gains are possible when defenses are tailored 
to attack context.  Cyber defenses that seem advantageous in general may not be 
advantageous in the specific context of attacks faced.  For example, given the attack model 
developed from [5], our POMDP-based policy includes only service reconfigurations even 
though IP reconfigurations were also available.  In practice, tailoring defenses to the attacks 
faced prevents investment in defenses that seem useful at face value but fail to return 
effective defensive advantage. 
58 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
This thesis provides several avenues for future work. Considering the proposed 
scheme in Chapter III, any part of the scheme could be updated to improve the end goal of 
optimizing the implementation of MTD techniques in order to minimize cost and maximize 
availability for the defender. There is room for improvement in each of the steps of our 
method of approach including model development, model solution, and analysis of results; 
however, the majority of potential improvement lies in model development.  
 The data used to develop the POMDP model in this thesis offers deep insight into 
one specific attack-defense context.  Because it is so tailored, conducting similar analysis 
across other attack models and with more defenses incorporated will offer similar deep 
insight into new models. This will facilitate broader and more generalized conclusions 
about what POMDP-based defense brings to the table.  For example, there are almost 
certainly attack scenarios in which IP reconfigurations would offer return on investment. 
The states of the POMDP model are also very specific to the attack defense context 
in this thesis. The attack model has recovery delay states that could potentially affect 
decision making when the system suspects it is near the attack state, 𝑆𝑆4. There is a 
possibility the system will incur the cost associated with 𝑆𝑆4 in order to get back to a more 
desirable state, such as the start state, 𝑆𝑆0. Modifications made to the model states could 
mitigate this potential undesirable effect and facilitate the POMDP model in performing 
exactly as designed. 
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APPENDIX A.  POMDP MODEL 
This appendix contains the xml-formatted encoding of the POMDP model for 
ingest into DESPOT, built from the template available from [21]. 
 
<pomdpx version=“0.1” id=“autogenerated” 
xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation=“pomdpx.xsd”> 
  <Description>Cyber defense scenario  
  </Description> 
  <Discount>0.95</Discount> 
  <Variable> 
    <StateVar vnamePrev=“attack_0” vnameCurr=“attack_1” 
fullyObs=“false”> 
    <ValueEnum>start ts vs el x1 x2 x3 x4 x5</ValueEnum> 
    </StateVar> 
    <ObsVar vname=“IDS”> 
    <ValueEnum>start ts vs el x</ValueEnum> 
    </ObsVar> 
    <ActionVar vname=“defense”> 
    <ValueEnum>nil d1 d2</ValueEnum> 
    </ActionVar> 
    <RewardVar vname=“reward”/> 
  </Variable> 
  <InitialStateBelief> 
    <CondProb> 
    <Var>attack_0</Var> 
    <Parent>null</Parent> 
    <Parameter type=“TBL”> 
      <Entry> 
        <Instance>-</Instance> 
        <ProbTable>1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0</ProbTable> 
      </Entry> 
    </Parameter> 
    </CondProb> 
  </InitialStateBelief> 
  <RewardFunction> 
    <Func> 
    <Var>reward</Var> 
    <Parent>defense attack_1</Parent> 
    <Parameter type=“TBL”> 
      <Entry> 
        <Instance>nil -</Instance> 
        <ValueTable>0 0 0 0 -695 0 0 0 0</ValueTable> 
      </Entry> 
      <Entry> 
        <Instance>d1 -</Instance> 
        <ValueTable>-0.635 -0.635 -0.635 -0.635 -695.635 -0.635 -0.635 
-0.635 -0.635</ValueTable> 
      </Entry> 
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      <Entry> 
        <Instance>d2 -</Instance> 
        <ValueTable>-9.59 -9.59 -9.59 -9.59 -704.59 -9.59 -9.59 -9.59 
-9.59</ValueTable> 
      </Entry> 
    </Parameter> 
    </Func> 
  </RewardFunction> 
  <ObsFunction> 
    <CondProb> 
    <Var>IDS</Var> 
    <Parent>attack_1</Parent> 
    <Parameter type = “TBL”> 
      <Entry> 
        <Instance>start -</Instance> 
        <ProbTable>1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0</ProbTable> 
      </Entry> 
      <Entry> 
        <Instance>ts -</Instance> 
        <ProbTable>0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0</ProbTable> 
      </Entry> 
      <Entry> 
        <Instance>vs -</Instance> 
        <ProbTable>0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0</ProbTable> 
      </Entry> 
      <Entry> 
        <Instance>el  -</Instance> 
        <ProbTable>0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 </ProbTable> 
      </Entry> 
 
      <Entry> 
        <Instance>x1 -</Instance> 
        <ProbTable>0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0</ProbTable> 
      </Entry> 
      <Entry> 
        <Instance>x2 -</Instance> 
        <ProbTable>0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0</ProbTable> 
      </Entry> 
      <Entry> 
        <Instance>x3 -</Instance> 
        <ProbTable>0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0</ProbTable> 
      </Entry> 
      <Entry> 
        <Instance>x4 -</Instance> 
        <ProbTable>0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0</ProbTable> 
      </Entry> 
      <Entry> 
        <Instance>x5 -</Instance> 
        <ProbTable>0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0</ProbTable> 
      </Entry> 
    </Parameter> 
    </CondProb> 
  </ObsFunction> 
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  <StateTransitionFunction> 
    <CondProb> 
    <Var>attack_1</Var> 
    <Parent>defense attack_0</Parent> 
    <Parameter type=“TBL”> 
      <Entry> 
        <Instance>* start -</Instance> 
        <ProbTable>0.6523 0.2360 0.08780 0.02391 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0</ProbTable> 
      </Entry> 
      <Entry> 
        <Instance>* x1 -</Instance> 
        <ProbTable>0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0</ProbTable> 
      </Entry> 
       <Entry> 
        <Instance>* x2 -</Instance> 
        <ProbTable>0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0</ProbTable> 
      </Entry> 
      <Entry> 
        <Instance>* x3 -</Instance> 
        <ProbTable>0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0</ProbTable> 
      </Entry> 
      <Entry> 
        <Instance>* x4 -</Instance> 
        <ProbTable>0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0</ProbTable> 
      </Entry> 
      <Entry> 
        <Instance>* x5 -</Instance> 
        <ProbTable>1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0</ProbTable> 
      </Entry>      <Entry> 
        <Instance>* el -</Instance> 
        <ProbTable>0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0</ProbTable> 
      </Entry> 
      <Entry> 
        <Instance>nil ts -</Instance> 
        <ProbTable>0.0 0.9237 0.06862 0.007713 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0</ProbTable> 
      </Entry> 
      <Entry> 
        <Instance>d1 ts -</Instance> 
        <ProbTable>0.0 0.9237 0.06862 0.007713 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0</ProbTable> 
      </Entry> 
      <Entry> 
        <Instance>d2 ts -</Instance> 
        <ProbTable>0.9956 0.004087 0.0003036 0.00003143 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0</ProbTable> 
      </Entry> 
      <Entry> 
        <Instance>nil vs -</Instance> 
        <ProbTable>0.0 0.0 0.7888 0.2112 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0</ProbTable> 
      </Entry> 
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      <Entry> 
        <Instance>d1 vs -</Instance> 
        <ProbTable>0.0 0.6667 0.2629 0.07041 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0</ProbTable> 
      </Entry> 
      <Entry> 
        <Instance>d2 vs -</Instance> 
        <ProbTable>0.0 0.0 0.7888 0.2112 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0</ProbTable> 
      </Entry> 
    </Parameter> 
    </CondProb> 

















APPENDIX B.  RESULTS INTERPRETATION SCRIPT 
This appendix includes the functions written in MATLAB to analyze the results we 
received after solving each of our POMDPs with DESPOT. It includes the scripts for 
testing DESPOT default parameters, for determining the optimal policy and limiting state 
probabilities, for verifying the optimal policy, and for testing Cases 1, 2, and 3 with 
different uncertainty levels. 
 
%% Despot default parameters 
  
%Default Parameters 
dectime9=[1 2 3 4 5]; 
attacks9=[.7311 .6796 .7368 .6510 .7941] ; 
cost9=[-.0316 -.0295 -.0325 -.0252 -.0283]; 
avail9=[99.0523 99.1158 99.0253 99.2444 99.1523]; 
  
%Both Reduced 
dectime10= [1 2 3 4 5]; 
attacks10=[.5881 .5137 .6339 .6625 .6796]; 
cost10= [-.4107 -.3941 -.3761 -.3312 -.3182]; 
avail10=[87.6788 88.1759 88.7166 90.0634 90.4545]; 
  
%Reduced depth 
attacks11=[.6224 .7082 .6510 .7769 .7025]; 
cost11= [-.0689 -.0705 -.0709 -.0792 -.0724]; 
avail11=[97.9331 97.8854 97.8728 97.6234 97.8267]; 
  
%reduced particles 
attacks12=[.7426 .5767 .6568 .6568 .6796]; 
cost12= [-.1082 -.1354 -.1392 -.1210 -.1424]; 












































legend(‘Default Parameters’,’Reduced Particles and Depth’,’Reduced 
Depth’,’Reduced Particles’) 
 
% Optimal Policy 
%1: nil 2: d1: service 3: d2: ip 
%markov decision process 
T(:,:,1)=[0.6523 0.2360 0.08780 0.02391 0 0 0 0 0 
  0 .9237 .06862 .007713 0 0 0 0 0 
  0 0 .7888 .2112 0 0 0 0 0 
  0 0 0 .5 .5 0 0 0 0 
  0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] 
T(:,:,2)=[0.6523 0.2360 0.08780 0.02391 0 0 0 0 0 
  0 .9237 .06862 .007713 0 0 0 0 0 
  0 .6667 .2629 .07041 0 0 0 0 0 
  0 0 0 .5 .5 0 0 0 0 
  0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] 
T(:,:,3)=[0.6523 0.2360 0.08780 0.02391 0 0 0 0 0 
  .9956 .004087 .0003036 .00003143 0 0 0 0 0 
  0 0 .7888 .2112 0 0 0 0 0 
  0 0 0 .5 .5 0 0 0 0 
  0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
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  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] 
   
Reward= [0 0 0 0 -695 0 0 0 0  
  -.635 -.635 -.635 -.635 -695.635 -.635 -.635 -.635 -.635 
  -9.59 -9.59 -9.59 -9.59 -704.59 -9.59 -9.59 -9.59 -9.59]’  
   
[V,OptPol,iter,cpu_time] = mdp_policy_iteration(T,Reward,.95); 
  






% Verify Optimal Policy 
data= readtable(‘Parsed_5_90_500_.txt’); 





cats1 = countcats(STATE); 






%% Case 1, Case 2, Case 3 
  
Percent_all=[95 85 75 65 55]; 
% Case 3 
R3_attack=[.7066 .6969 .7005 .6791 .7066]; 
R3_avail=[98.2657 96.8390 95.7596 95.0171 94.5020]; 
R3_cost=[-.0578 -.1054 -.1413 -.1661 -.1833]; 
  
% Case 2 
R2_attack=[.7137 .7218 .7005 .7126 .7112]; 
R2_avail=[98.7362 98.1572 97.6489 97.0259 96.4233]; 
R2_cost=[-.0421 -.0614 -.0784 -.0991 -.1192]; 
  
% Case 1 
R_attack=[.6851 .7002 .6888 .7061 .6939]; 
R_avail=[96.9886 95.9605 95.8763 95.4406 95.2461]; 








plot(Percent_all , R_attack) 
xlabel('Probability of Detection, p_D'); 
ylabel('Percentage Attacks, $$\hat{\alpha}$$','Interpreter','Latex'); 
ylim([0 100]) 









plot(Percent_all , abs(R_cost)) 
xlabel('Probability of Detection, p_D '); 
ylabel('Absolute Value of Cost, |\eta|'); 










plot(Percent_all , R_avail) 
xlabel('Probability of Detection, p_D '); 
ylabel('Percentage Availability, \nu'); 












cats1 = countcats(STATE); 











cats2 = countcats(STATE2); 
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cats3 = countcats(STATE3); 











cats4 = countcats(STATE4); 











cats5 = countcats(STATE5); 







G = categorical({‘start’,’ts’,’vs’,’el’,’x’}); 






















attacks_tot=[attacks1 attacks2 attacks3 attacks4 attacks5] 

















%output: how often did reconfigurations occur in each state 
STATS=[catsB1./90330 catsC./90330];  
end 
  






  if strcmp(data1(i),data2(i)) 
    tf=[tf;1]; 
  else 
    tf=[tf;0]; 










































































x = h.BinEdges ; 










x = h.BinEdges ; 










x = h.BinEdges ; 










x = h.BinEdges ; 










x = h.BinEdges ; 























B= cell2mat(b1) + cell2mat(bb1); 
B= num2cell(B); 
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